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ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No, 920198 
v. : 900379-CA 
JAMES F. GARDNER, : 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err when it affirmed 
petitioner's forgery conviction, ruling that his challenge to 
state trial court jurisdiction, based upon his allegation that he 
is an Indian, could not prevail under the Ute Partition Act of 
1954? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
AND 
ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals opinion, State v. Gardner, appears 
in 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, copied at Appendix I to this brief; it 
was entered by the court on March 18, 1992. Petitioner did not 
request rehearing of the case by the court of appeals; his 
petition for certiorari was timely filed, on April 16, 1992. 
Petitioner asserts that all grounds for granting 
certiorari listed in Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
exist here. As explained in this brief, the only possible viable 
ground for review by this Court is that found in Rule 46(d): 
"When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should 
be, settled by the Supreme Court." 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States 
Constitution vests the United States Congress with the power 
"[t]o regulate commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes." 
Article III of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part that, absent the consent of the United States to 
do otherwise: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm 
and declare that they forever disclaim all 
right and title to the unappropriated public 
lands lying within the boundaries hereof, and 
to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and 
that until the title thereto shall have been 
extinguished by the United States, the same 
shall be and remain subject to the 
disposition of the United States, and said 
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of 
the United States. . . . 
25 U.S.C. § 677v (1988), of the Ute Partition 
Act of 1954 provides: 
Upon removal of Federal restrictions on 
the property of each individual mixed-blood 
member of the [Ute] tribe, the Secretary [of 
the Interior] shall publish in the Federal 
Register a proclamation declaring that the 
Federal trust relationship to such individual 
is terminated. Thereafter, such individual 
shall not be entitled to any of the services 
performed for Indians because of his status 
as an Indian. All statutes*of the United 
States which affect Indians because of their 
status as Indians shall no longer be 
applicable to such member over which 
supervision has been terminated, and the laws 
of the several States shall apply to such 
2 
member in the same manner as they apply to 
other citizens within their jurisdiction. 
(Emphasis added.) 
• STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
TL in 11 in i i, HI i in ii h>in]i' in s t n t e t r i a l c o u r t 
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c h a l l e n g e . 
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Aag..s: - r £ ^ .;^ .. 
r e s p ^ / e ' i c e d r ^ r e c a n t L S t a t e v . Johnson i . i 
d f a i l e d * appea 
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a n u w c ^ r ^ t i i x c n e i ;— — r e ^ t i y app^ :, h: - ::i\ . c t i c : v e •: ..: * 
nf apne t . 
a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t r a i s e d h i p " I n ^ a n ,.: ^ ._ . . 
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ancestry and Indian affiliation were assumed to be true, those 
allegations made him out to be a "terminated mixed-blood Ute 
Indian," and therefore subject to state court jurisdiction under 
the federal Ute Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C. S 677 (1988). 
Third, the State argued that if the first two points were 
rejected, the case should be remanded to the trial court, to make 
findings on the fact-sensitive issue of whether petitioner is 
entitled to Indian status for criminal jurisdiction purposes, 
with petitioner to carry the burden of proof. 
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction under the 
State's second point. The court agreed that defendant had 
alleged "mixed-blood" Ute status. Therefore, because the United 
States Congress had terminated "mixed-blood" Utes from federal 
supervision under 25 U.S.C. § 677v (1988), defendant was subject 
to state court criminal jurisdiction even if his allegations were 
true. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47. Accordingly, the court 
of appeals did not analyze the State's waiver argument and its 
argument about burden of proof on a possible remand. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PETITIONER DEMONSTRATES NEITHER LEGAL 
CONFLICT NOR A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL 
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT 
OF APPEALS RESOLUTION OF HIS APPEAL. 
Petitioner asks this Court to "clarify[] the limits and 
boundaries of Indian Status Jurisdictional challenge consistent 
with State Constitutional Provisions and State v. Haoen . . . " 
(Petition at 11). He suggests that the opinion in this case 
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conflicted with the court of appeals opinion in Hagen.: 
'' i «^ i Ape |M«'iiii|p cert, granted, 815 P. 2d 24 1 (Utah 
Nut. Su, 
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unc Jintah n'- uray Reservatio:. 
nave been d i ^ s i d i , . ^ t J a... ar^ nr .. . 
- - whp* :v- q:.^t-i^:> > i defendant Haqe - l^i.a1. s- n:1:0 
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- - ,>tory ground-
Hagen, remov; • : * • - - groun'i i i c: r ^  •_ t * : t;:L..iari uiiae : . 
Nor .a° petii.Diiei shown jr y i • • i 1 >• " boti.M'1", • ' « '" 
-royals d^-isiDii anc any opinion ol this Court mi a question 
i M-'I t i II*"T I " " h i -vp;! | jpriu whi ch 
r e n . o r a r «. c* canted undei ULOJI I I\\ \ i II i m | nn-
State has found no Ut.ah Supreme Court case, nor has petitioner 
ci,te«.;l dn_y b i n l" ' «""v>"" i li».i i i h ie uuurt of appeals 
opinion here. 
Petitioner also apparently complains that the court; of 
appea . departed ti urn «»(. i u\A HI I t 11 "•- i lion i i dent j e d h i '< m o t J o n 
to "suspend"" his appeal and remand the case 1 the triaJ court 
for fact findings on his allegation of Indian status (Petition at 
4, 11-12), The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide 
for such "suspension." Further, Utah R. App. P. 23 suggests that 
the grant or denial of a motion filed during the pendency of an 
appeal is a matter within the appellate court's discretion. The 
court of appeals did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
petitioner's "suspension and remand" motion. Accordingly, the 
court did not depart from accepted and usual practice, and this 
Utah R. App. P. 46(c) ground for certiorari is not present. 
POINT TWO 
THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL, AND STATE LAW DECIDED BY 
THE COURT OF APPEALS NEED NOT BE REVISITED BY 
THIS COURT. 
This Court may grant certiorari to review a court of 
appeals decision on an "important question of municipal, state, 
or federal law . . .." Utah R. App. P. 46(d). The question of 
whether "terminated mixed-blood" Ute Indians are subject to state 
court criminal jurisdiction is important. However, it was 
correctly answered by the court of appeals, and there is no need 
for this Court to review the issue. 
Examining petitioner's own allegations, the court of 
appeals determined that those allegations make him out to be, at 
best, a "mixed-blood" Ute. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47. 
The court held that under the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. § 677v 
(1988), "mixed-blood" Utes are subject to state court criminal 
jurisdiction. Id. This accords with settled federal law, 
including that of the Utah federal district court. See United 
6 
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In i ie i ' inked UUMI I I li msiMit n | II In l l i i i h i l l P h u t o - . . , The 
lite Partition Act provides precisely such consent Even before 
1
 he A-1 •  passaqr in 1UH|I( i hi r pnurt and the United States 
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crimes 'nrii an country , State v. 
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The court of appea ] s correct 1 y ai t JL I med petitioner' s 
conviction on a legal ground that is consistent with established 
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law. Accordingly, there is no need for this Court to review this 
case, and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this H day of May, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
«L_ 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a four true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to James F. Gardner, pro se, P.O. 
Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this \H day of May, 1992. 
i^-Uy 
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APPENDIX I 
Court of Appeals Opinion 
Provo. Utah 
^ P A M u w a 
182 Uuh Adv. Rep 46 _ 47 
Cite is 
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Ptaiatiff aid Appellee, 
v. 
James F. GARDNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900379-CA 
FILED: March 18,1992 
Eighth District, Duchesne County 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne 
ATTORNEYS: 
James F. Gardner, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
pnbikation in the Pacific Reporter. 
BENCH, Presiding Jndge: 
James F. Gardner appeals his conviction of 
a single count of forgery on jurisdictional 
grounds. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On August 14, 1985, Gardner was convicted 
in state court of forgery, a second degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-501(3Xb) (1990). The evidence before the 
trial court indicated that Gardner negotiated a 
check belonging to his brother-in-law to 
Rebecca Neary in Roosevelt, Utah.1 Gardner 
was sentenced to serve from one to fifteen 
years at the Utah State Prison. 
Almost four years later, Gardner petitioned 
the trial court for post conviction relief, 
seeking resentencing nunc pro tunc to allow 
him to take a direct appeal. Gardner alleged 
that he instructed trial counsel to appeal the 
forgery conviction and believed an appeal had 
been taken, but that trial counsel had failed to 
comply with his request. The trial court found 
the allegations to be true, and resentenced 
Gardner in accordance with State v. Johnson, 
635 P.2d 36,38 (Utah 1981). 
Now on appeal, Gardner alleges that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction over him due to 
his Indian status. As an addendum to his 
appellate brief, Gardner includes a personal 
affidavit in support of his claimed Indian 
status.2 The affidavit states that Gardner's 
paternal and maternal grandfathers were "full-
blooded" Ute Indians;3 that both his mother 
and his maternal grandmother were enrolled as 
members of the Uintah band of the Ute tribe 
until their status was terminated in 1954; that 
his father is eligible for enrollment with the 
Uncompahgre Band of the Ute tribe in Colo-
rado; that Gardner is associated with the 
Uintah Band of the Affiliated Ute Citizens; 
that Gardner is a second generation 
"terminated Ute"; that Gardner was raised, 
educated, and employed on the reservation; 
that Gardner practices Indian religion by 
participation in Indian ceremonies and culture; 
and that Gardner is known as an Indian rights 
activist. 
JURISDICTION 
Gardner alleges that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over him due to his claimed Indian 
status. "It has long been held that exclusive 
federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in 
'Indian country' includes all persons found to 
be 'Indian' under federal law ...." Ute Indian 
Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 
1078 n.14 (1981) (citations omitted); see also 
18 U.S.C. §§1152-1153 (1984). 
Between 1954 and 1956, Congress carved 
out certain exceptions to exclusive federal 
supervision over Indian property and persons. 
See 25 U.S.C. §§450-1300. See also Affil-
iated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States. 
406 U.S. 128, 133, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1462 
(1972). Under 25 U.S.C. §677, Congress 
terminated federal supervision over trust pro-
perty of the Ute Indian Tribe on the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation, and ordered the par-
MCE REPORTS 
tition and distribution of tribal assets between 
"mixed-blood" and "full-blood" members. 
As part of that partition and distribution, 
Congress terminated exclusive federal superv-
ision over "mixed-blood" Utes under 25 
U.S.C. §677v, which states, in relevant 
portion, as follows: 
All statutes of the United States 
which affect Indians because of 
their status as Indians shall no 
longer be applicable to such 
member over which supervision has 
been terminated, and the laws of 
the several States shall apply to 
such member in the same manner as 
they apply to other citizens within 
their jurisdiction. 
By terminating federal control over "mixed-
blood" Utes, Congress expressly transferred 
jurisdiction over them to state courts. 
The challenge to jurisdiction based on 
Indian status could conceivably present a 
question of fact that would require remand for 
an evidentiary hearing. In the present case, 
however, remand is unnecessary because 
Gardner has not asserted facts sufficient to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. 
Gardner asserts that he is a "terminated Ute." 
The term "terminated Ute" is synonymous 
with "mixed-blood" Ute as used in 25 U.S.C. 
§677v. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 
1463 (1972). Gardner further asserts that he is 
associated with the Affiliated Ute Citizens, an 
unincorporated association of "mixed-blood" 
Utes organized pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §677e. Id. 
Therefore, even if we take as true the 
representations proffered in Gardner's affid-
avit, the trial court had jurisdiction over 
Gardner because exclusive federal jurisdiction 
over "mixed-blood" Utes has been termin-
ated. 
CONCLUSION 
Gardner failed to present facts sufficient to 
raise a jurisdictional challenge. We therefore 
affirm his conviction. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. For purposes of this opinion, we assume that 
Roosevelt lies within the boundaries of the Uintah 
and Ouray Indian Reservation. See Ute Indian Tribe 
v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. Utah 
1981). See also State v. Hagcn, 802 P.2d 745, 746 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991). 
2. It is well settled that we do not review evidence 
presented for the first time on appeal. Munns v. 
Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah App. 1990). We 
therefore do not consider Gardner's affidavit as 
proof of the fact* alleged therein. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
48 Gridley Associates v. T 182 Uuh Ad 
3. 25 U.S.C. §677a defines a "full-blood* Ute as 
•a member of the tribe who possesses one-half 
degree of Ute Indian blood and a total of Indian 
blood in excess of one-half, excepting those who 
become mixed-bloods by choice.../ A "mixed-
blood" Ute, by comparison, is defined as "a 
member of the tribe who does not possess sufficient 
Indian or Ute Indian blood to fall within the full-
blood class as herein defined, and those who 
become mixed-bloods by choice under the provis-
ions of section 677c of this title." Id. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff and Appellee, i 
V • i 
JAMES F. GARDNER, i 
Defendant and Appellant. i 
t Case No. 900379-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of forgery, Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-501(3)(b) (1978), a second degree felony, in the 
Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Duchesne County, the 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, District Court Judge Pro Tem, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant's pro se brief on appeal, while clearly the 
product of diligent labor, addresses a number of legal, 
historical, and political points that are not necessarily 
pertinent to this case. The State believes that those points 
that are pertinent can be properly addressed within defendant's 
argument that "the State of Utah Lackfed] Personal, Subject 
Matter, and territorial Jurisdiction" to prosecute him for the 
forgery (Br. of Appellant at 5). 
Accordingly, the State will address defendant's appeal 
as the question of whether the state trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to try the case. Defendant alleges that the forgery 
occurred in "Indian country," and that he is a Native American 
"Indian." Based on these allegations, he argues that 
jurisdiction over this case rested exclusively with the federal 
district court (Br. of Appellant at 5, 6). 
As developed more fully in the State's argument, the 
ultimate legal determination of jurisdiction here depends upon 
subsidiary issues of fact, reviewable on a "clear error" 
standard. See State v. Vigil, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 30 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
The State presents two additional issues, either of 
which may resolve this appeal without reaching the merits of 
defendant's claim that he is an Indian. First, it must be 
ascertained whether defendant failed to raise his jurisdictional 
challenge in the trial court. This presents a question of law, 
inasmuch as this court must independently examine the record. If 
defendant did not thus preserve his jurisdictional challenge for 
appeal, it must then be decided, as a matter of law, whether to 
affirm the conviction. 
Second, if defendant is assumed to be an Indian, there 
is an issue of whether the state of Utah has criminal 
jurisdiction over him pursuant to the Ute Partition Act of 1954, 
25 U.S.C.A. SS 677-677aa (West 1983). This is an issue of law, 
reviewed on a correction-of-error standard, in that it entails 
statutory interpretation. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 
2 
P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States 
Constitution vests the United States Congress with the power 
*[t]o regulate commerce . . • with the Indian Tribes." 
Article III of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part that, absent the consent of the United States to 
do otherwise: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm 
and declare that they forever disclaim all 
right and title to the unappropriated public 
lands lying within the boundaries hereof, and 
to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and 
that until the title thereto shall have been 
extinguished by the United States, the same 
shall be and remain subject to the 
disposition of the United States, and said 
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of 
the United States. . . . 
The Federal Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988) 
provides: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided 
by law, the general laws of the United States 
as to the punishment of offenses committed in 
any place within the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the 
Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to 
offenses committed by one Indian against the 
person or property of another Indian, nor to 
any Indian committing any offense in the 
Indian country who has been*punished by the 
local law of the tribe, or to any case where, 
by treaty stipulations, the exclusive 
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be 
secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
25 U.S.C. S 677v (1988), of the Ute Partition 
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Act of 1954 provides: 
Upon removal of Federal restrictions on 
the property of each individual mixed-blood 
member of the [Ute] tribe, the Secretary [of 
the Interior] shall publish in the Federal 
Register a proclamation declaring that the 
Federal trust relationship to such individual 
is terminated. Thereafter, such individual 
shall not be entitled to any of the services 
performed for Indians because of his status 
as an Indian. All statutes of the United 
States which affect Indians because of their 
status as Indians shall no longer be 
applicable to such member over which 
supervision has been terminated, and the laws 
of the several States shall apply to such 
member in the same manner as they apply to 
other citizens within their jurisdiction. 
Necessary text of any other relevant constitutional, 
statutory, and rule provisions is contained in the body of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant James F. Gardner was charged in the state 
court with a single count of second degree felony forgery, Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-501(3)(b) (1990) (R. 2). He was found guilty as 
charged by jury trial on August 14, 1985, and sentenced to serve 
one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison (R. 28, 45). 
Nearly four years later, defendant petitioned for 
postconviction relief, alleging that he had asked his trial 
counsel to appeal the forgery conviction shortly after trial, and 
that counsel had failed to honor that request (R. 56-59). 
Finding this allegation to be true, tfce trial court granted the 
petition, and resentenced defendant for the conviction (R. 128, 
148-49). This direct appeal followed. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The forgery for which defendant was convicted occurred 
in the city of Roosevelt (T. 8/14/85 at 18), which lies within 
the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. See 
map appended to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 
1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981). Trial testimony showed that defendant 
had, without authorization, obtained check blanks belonging to 
his brother-in-law and negotiated one of these for 150 dollars 
(T. 8/14/85 at 10-12, 15-16).l 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant never raised his jurisdictional challenge in 
the trial court. Nor was the the prosecution or the trial court 
otherwise informed of the need to prove jurisdiction by showing 
that defendant is not an Indian. 
Indian jurisdiction is usually treated as a question of 
subject matter jurisdiction, which is not waived by the absence 
of a timely trial court objection. However, based on policy 
considerations and sound precedent, this jurisdictional challenge 
should be considered waived by defendant's failure to raise it in 
the trial court, and the conviction should be affirmed. 
If defendant's belated factual assertions about Indian 
status are assumed to be true, his conviction should be affirmed 
under the Ute Partition Act of 1954. Under that Act, defendant, 
*Record citations: "R.H refers to the trial court record in 
this case only, defendant's forgery conviction. "T." refers to 
hearing transcripts on the date indicated in this case, including 
defendant's petition for postconviction relief. 
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as a "mixed-blood" Ute Indian, is subject to state court criminal 
jurisdiction. 
If this court will not affirm the conviction on either 
of the foregoing bases, the resolution of this jurisdictional 
challenge still turns on the fact-sensitive issue of whether 
defendant is an Indian. In this event, because no evidence on 
this issue exists in the present trial court record, defendant's 
challenge should be remanded to the trial court. On remand, 
defendant should bear the burden of proving that jurisdiction was 
lacking. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
Some background on the law of Indian criminal 
jurisdiction as it applies to this case is helpful to place the 
arguments in perspective. A thorough overview is found in 
Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands; A Journey 
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976) 
("Clinton") (copied at Appendix 1 of this brief). As a general 
rule, criminal jurisdiction over Indian country rests exclusively 
with the federal courts. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; Utah Const. 
Art. Ill; 18 U.S.C. SS 1152, 1153 (1988); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 
28, 29 (7th Cir. 1938), cert, denied, 306 U.S. 643, 59 S. Ct. 581 
(1939); Clinton at 523 & n. 94. 
Congress, however, has authorized certain exceptions to 
the general rule. Title 18 U.S.C, sections 1152 and 1153, read 
together, specifically except "minor" Indian against Indian 
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crimes within Indian country from exclusive federal 
jurisdiction.2 Jurisdiction over such crimes is in the tribal 
courts. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2, 97 S. 
Ct. 1395, 1397 n. 2 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 61, 102nd Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 3-4, (1991) (attached as exhibit D to Br. of 
Appellant).3 
Congress has also granted some states criminal 
jurisdiction over at least portions of Indian country, under 18 
U.S.C. S 1162 (1988). Utah is not included under this particular 
grant of jurisdiction. Congress now also allows state 
jurisdiction over Indian offenses in Indian country upon the 
express consent of Indian tribes, and Utah has expressed its 
willingness to accept such jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. S 1321 
(1988); Utah Code Ann. § 63-36-201 (Supp. 1991). To date, 
however, Utah has received no tribal consent to state 
jurisdiction under these provisions. 
However, another important source of congressionally-
authorized state jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country 
2Section 1152 states that federal jurisdiction "shall not 
extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian . . . .,f However, section 1153, the 
Major Crimes Act, takes back much of this section 1152 exception, 
bringing certain major crimes by Indians in Indian country, whether 
or not against other Indians, within federal jurisdiction. 
Clinton questions whether tribal jurisdiction over Indian 
against Indian crimes is indeed limited to minor crimes. 18 Ariz. 
L. Rev. at 559-60. However, tribal courts are limited in the 
punishment they may mete out, to one year imprisonment or a 
$5000.00 fine, or both, per offense. 25 U.S.C. $ 1302(7) (1988). 
3Section 1152 also exempts crimes punished by tribal law, and 
crimes where jurisdiction rests in the tribe by treaty, from 
federal jurisdiction. Clinton reports that the only treaties 
vesting criminal jurisdiction in Indian tribes were executed before 
the end of the eighteenth century. Clinton at 531 & n. 128. 
exists in the various Indian tribe "termination acts/' passed 
largely in the 1950s. Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 548 & n. 220, 
550-51. This source of state jurisdiction is significant here, 
in that "mixed-blood" Ute Indians were terminated from federal 
supervision and placed under state jurisdiction by the Ute 
Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C. SS 677-677aa (1988). 
A major judicially-created exception to exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over Indian country is that crimes in Indian 
country where neither the victim nor the perpetrator is an Indian 
are subject to state jurisdiction. United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U.S. 313, 324, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (1978), cited in Goforth v. 
State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Clinton, 18 
Ariz. L. Rev. at 524-25. 
Finally, the jurisdiction exercised by tribal courts 
varies from tribe to tribe. Here, the Ute Indian Tribe, which 
occupies the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, does not take 
jurisdiction of cases where the parties are not formally enrolled 
members of that tribe, where an alternative forum exists to 
resolve the case, and where tribal interests are not affected. 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 n.8 
(D. Utah 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th 
Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596 
(1986) (citing Ute Tribe Law and Order Code). 
The forgoing jurisdictional rules effectively provide 
that where the perpetrator or the victim of a crime, but not 
both, are Indian, and the crime is committed within Indian 
8 
country/ then jurisdiction rests exclusively with the federal 
court. However, even if a criminal defendant is an Indian, he or 
she will fall under state jurisdiction if a federal termination 
act so provides. Where neither the perpetrator nor the victim is 
an Indian, even where the crime occurs in Indian country, the 
state court has jurisdiction. If both perpetrator and victim are 
Indian, and the crime occurs in Indian country and is "minor," 
then tribal courts may have jurisdiction. 
Here, defendant does not allege that both he and the 
victim of his crime are Indians, nor does he otherwise suggest 
that jurisdiction properly lies in the Ute tribal court. Indeed, 
under Ute tribal law, he has no basis for such an assertion, 
because he does not claim to be formally enrolled in that tribe. 
Instead, defendant's claim is that only the federal district 
court had jurisdiction to try him for the forgery (Br. of 
Appellant at 5, 6). Thus the claimed jurisdictional conflict is 
only between state and federal jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM WAS WAIVED BY THE 
FAILURE TO RAISE IT IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND 
THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. To Fall Outside State Jurisdiction Under 
Present Law. Defendant Must be an Indian. 
As explained in the introduction to this argument, in 
order for defendant to fall outside of state jurisdiction, his 
crime must have been committed in Indian country, and defendant 
must be an Indian. Under the present law of this Court, the 
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forgery was committed in Indian country, because Roosevelt lies 
within the outer boundary of an Indian reservation. State v. 
Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April 
23, 1991, Utah Supreme Court No. 910017. This law may change, 
however, pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's grant of certiorari 
in Haaen and the pending case of State v. Perank, Utah Supreme 
Court No. 860196. Both those cases deal with the question of 
whether the town of Myton, near Roosevelt, is no longer Indian 
country, because of federal "disestablishment" of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation/ 
If the supreme court rules in favor of the State in 
Haaen and Perank, it is likely that Roosevelt can also be held 
not to be Indian country. In that case, even if defendant is an 
Indian, his conviction would be proper because the crime was 
committed outside of Indian country, under exclusive state court 
jurisdiction. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 
1459 (D.S.D. 1988) ("State courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over crimes occurring outside of Indian country"). See also Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-1-201(a) (1990) (Utah state courts have 
jurisdiction over offenses committed within the state). As it 
did in Haaen. then, the State suggests that it may be wise for 
this court to await the outcome of Perank, and now also Haaen, in 
the supreme court before deciding this case. 
However, even if the Indian country status of Roosevelt 
*The State's brief in Haaen. including a portion of its brief 
in Perank, is copied at Appendix 2 of this brief. 
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must be accepted for the time being, it cannot be conceded that 
defendant is an Indian. Even now, he has provided no independent 
corroboration of Indian status, but relies solely on the naked 
allegations in his brief and attached affidavit. 
The two elements required to prove Indian status are 
recited in Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2. First, it must appear 
that defendant has a significant percentage of Indian blood, and 
second, defendant must be recognized as an Indian either by the 
federal government or some group of Indians. Ld. (citations 
omitted); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938); Clinton, 
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503, 515-16 (1976) (copied 
at Appendix 1 of this brief). 
The foregoing elements of Indian status are highly 
fact-dependent. The "Indian blood" element, for example, 
presents a question of fact, quite apart from the legal question 
of how much Indian blood is sufficient to satisfy that element. 
See Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2 (noting division of authority on 
the latter question). See Brief of Appellant at 36 (alleging 
Indian ancestry). 
The allegations now made by defendant to support the 
"recognition" element of Indian status are also factual issues. 
See Brief of Appellant at 35-36 (alleging history of Indian 
upbringing, receipt of Indian benefits, participation in Indian 
culture, membership in Indian organizations). However, defendant 
raised no jurisdictional challenge and presented no evidence on 
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any factual issues related to Indian status in the trial court. 
B. The Jurisdictional Problem in this Case was 
Neither Raised Nor Otherwise Apparent to the Trial 
Court. 
In his brief on appeal and the affidavit he has 
attached to that brief, defendant asserts that he raised his 
jurisdictional challenge in the trial court, and that his 
challenge was repeatedly rebuffed (Br. of Appellant at 2, 3, 9). 
None of these assertions are documented by record citations, as 
required by Utah R. App. P. 24(e). 
Neither defendant's brief nor the affidavit attached to 
that brief are part of the record on appeal, because neither is 
an original paper or exhibit filed with the trial court. Utah R. 
App. P. 11(a). Therefore, the factual allegations therein, to 
the extent they are offered as evidence, should be ignored. 
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to 
matters outside the record are inappropriate, irrelevant, and 
will not be considered on appeal). Further, the State's 
examination of the actual record has revealed no jurisdictional 
challenge.5 
5For example, defendant claims that he raised his 
jurisdictional challenge on or about March 18, 1985 (Br. of 
Appellant at 2). The record shows that a hearing was held on March 
19, 1985, but the minute entry commemorating that hearing does not 
mention any jurisdictional challenge (R. 7). 
Defendant claims to have renewed his jurisdictional challenge 
during an in-chambers conference just^before his forgery trial, on 
August 14, 1985 (affidavit attached to Br, of Appellant, at 3(A)). 
However, the record reveals only a motion in limine, which was 
granted (T. 8/14/85 at 3-4), and a later motion to dismiss based on 
insufficient evidence, which was denied (T. 8/14/85 at 27-28). 
Finally, defendant also claims that he raised his 
jurisdictional challenge during proceedings involving a murder 
12 
Defendant also failed to raise the jurisdictional issue 
at any point in the trial court proceedings associated with his 
petition for postconviction relief in this case (e.g., R* 56-59; 
T. 3/1/90). Thus he raises the Indian jurisdiction issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
Consistent with the absence of any jurisdictional 
challenge, the trial court records are otherwise devoid of any 
evidence that defendant is an Indian. The issue did not even 
arise inadvertently through evidence and testimony routinely 
presented in the case. Additionally, it does not appear that the 
possibility of Indian status should have been obvious to the 
trial court. Defendant's name does not suggest that he is an 
Indian, and the record contains no reference to his race. As 
follows, then, because the Indian jurisdiction issue was not 
raised in the trial court, it should be deemed waived on appeal. 
C. The Indian Status Issue Should be Deemed 
Waived bv Defendant's Failure to Raise it in 
the Trial Court. 
Defendant argues that the state court lacked "Personal, 
Subject Matter, and territorial Jurisdiction" to prosecute him 
for the forgery (Br. of Appellant at 5). To resolve this appeal, 
some consideration must be given to which, if any, of these types 
of jurisdictional problems exists here. 
The "territorial jurisdiction" problem appears to 
charge that was pending against him at the same time as the forgery 
charge (Br. of Appellant at 2). The murder case record is not a 
part of the record in this case. Accordingly, references to the 
murder case should also be ignored, and will not be further 
addressed in the State's brief. 
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address the status of the place where the forgery occurred, 
specifically, whether Roosevelt is Indian country. As noted, 
because that issue is pending before the Utah Supreme Court in 
Haaen and Perank, the State, without conceding it, will not 
further address it in this brief. 
It remains to be determined whether the jurisdictional 
problem should be treated as one of personal jurisdiction or as 
subject matter jurisdiction. As follows, the State's position is 
that while the problem resembles subject matter jurisdiction, it 
should be treated here as having been waived, like personal 
jurisdiction, by the failure to present it in the trial court. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (applicable to criminal proceedings via 
Utah R. Civ. P. 81) (personal jurisdiction defect is waived if 
not raised in trial court). 
Utah law is unsettled on the question of whether Indian 
jurisdiction should be treated as personal jurisdiction or 
subject matter jurisdiction. In State Dep't of Social Services 
v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
avoided the question in a civil context, reversing a judgment for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby not reaching 
defendant's claim that personal jurisdiction was also lacking. 
Id. at 1134. In Haaen and State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228, 1229 
(Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, Utah Supreme Court No. 900019 
(March 7, 1990), this Court treated tKe problem in the criminal 
context without reference to whether it involved personal or 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
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Because Indian jurisdiction involves the allocation of 
authority among various courts, it would appear to involve 
subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, it has been held that 
Indian criminal jurisdiction, like subject matter jurisdiction, 
cannot be waived by the failure to raise it or by consent of the 
parties. See St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1458; In re Carmen's 
Petition, 165 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1958), aff'd sub nom. 
Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9 Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 361 
U.S. 934, 80 S. Ct. 375, reh'q denied, 361 U.S. 973, 80 S. Ct. 
585 (1960); Wesley v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 290, 346 P.2d 658, 
662 (1959) (en banc). See also Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 528 
("the issue is subject matter jurisdiction"). 
However, it is questionable whether Indian criminal 
jurisdiction must be strictly treated as non-waivable, subject 
matter jurisdiction. One authority does not cast general 
criminal jurisdiction in terms of personal versus subject matter 
jurisdiction at all, but rather as the power to create criminal 
laws versus the power to enforce them. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law § 2.7(a) (1986). Notwithstanding the 
authority to the contrary, it has been held, as follows, that the 
issue of Indian criminal jurisdiction can be waived. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit applies a "raise it or lose it" approach to the federal 
prosecution of non-Indians who commit*crimes in Indian country* 
It is far more manageable for the defendant 
to shoulder the burden of producing evidence 
that he is a member of a federally recognized 
tribe than it is for the Government to 
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produce evidence that he is not a member of 
any one of the hundreds of such tribes. We 
accordingly hold that the Government need not 
allege the non-Indian status of the defendant 
in an indictment under [18 U.S.C.A.] section 
1152, nor does it have the burden of going 
forward on that issue. Once the defendant 
properly raises the issue of his Indian 
status, then the ultimate burden of proof 
remains, of course, upon the Government. 
United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Hester thus held that it is not necessary for the prosecution to 
allege or prove a defendant's non-Indian status until and unless 
the issue is raised by the defendant. 
For several reasons, the Hester approach is sound in a 
case like this, where neither the prosecution nor the trial court 
were on notice that an Indian jurisdiction problem might exist. 
First, if strictly treated as subject matter and entertained even 
though not timely presented, a parade of other state-convicted 
felons who committed their crimes in Indian country can be 
expected to raise similar uncorroborated claims that they are 
"Indians" and demand that their convictions be reversed. This is 
a particularly nightmarish possibility if the burden is placed on 
the State disprove such belated claims.6 
Second, it is the criminal defendant who will best know 
his or her own racial and social background. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect the defendant to raise the Indian 
jurisdiction issue. Such an expectation would not shift the 
6As explained in Point Three, section C of this brief, the 
State's position is that the burden of proving Indian status should 
rest with defendant where the Indian jurisdiction challenge is not 
raised until after the conviction. 
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ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction at trial, which, under 
Haoen, 802 P. 2d at 747, lies with the prosecution.7 It would 
simply provide the prosecution with notice that the burden exists 
in the special Indian jurisdiction context, when it is not 
otherwise apparent. 
Third, under the Federal Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1152 
(1988), and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 13 (1988), 
if defendant were tried in the federal court, that forum would 
apply Utah's forgery statute to his offense. See United States 
v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 
404 U.S. 842, 97 S. Ct. 137 (Montana forgery statute applied to 
Indian country prosecution in federal court). Defendant does not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that supports his 
conviction. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that he 
would receive any better treatment or a more favorable outcome in 
the federal court, applying Utah law. In this light, defendant's 
effort to challenge jurisdiction can be seen as nothing more than 
forum shopping. To entertain his challenge now would encourage 
criminal defendants who may be Indians to withhold that claim in 
the state court and then, if convicted, raise it to avoid the 
conviction. Requiring the issue to be raised in the trial court 
will discourage the temptation to thus "plant error" in the trial 
court, a practice this court has condemned. See State v. 
Belaard, 811 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah App. 1991). 
7Contra, State v. Klindt, 782 F.2d 401, 403-04 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1989) (defendant seeking to avoid state jurisdiction has 
burden of proving Indian status). 
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Fourth, a "raise it or lose it" approach is also 
consistent with Hagen. In Haaen. the reversible error was the 
State's failure, in the trial court, "to prove he [defendant] is 
not an Indian when confronted with his claim that he is." 802 
P.2d at 746 (emphasis added). Haoen thus assumes that the claim 
of Indian status will be raised in the trial court. Such claim 
was absent here; nor, as noted earlier, was the possibility of 
that claim otherwise apparent. Compare In re Carmen's Petition, 
165 F. Supp. at 950 (although jurisdictional challenge not 
formally raised, trial testimony that defendant was an Indian put 
court on notice of problem, and challenge was not waived). 
Finally, it should be noted that in other contexts, a 
failure to raise a jurisdictional defect in the trial court 
operates as a waiver of the defect on appeal. E.g., State v. 
Smith, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 42 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. 
Ouintana, No. 900264-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah App. Oct. 4, 1991) 
(State's failure to raise untimeliness of motion to withdraw 
plea, arguably jurisdictional in character, waived where not 
properly raised in trial court). See also State v. Pierce, 782 
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah App. 1989) (non-expiration of criminal 
statute of limitations is jurisdictional issue to be proven by 
prosecution "whenever that issue is properly raised"). 
In sum, because defendant did not make his present 
allegations of Indian status in the trial court, and because 
neither the State nor the trial court was otherwise on notice 
that defendant might be an Indian, this court should hold that 
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defendant waived the issue. Accordingly, his forgery conviction 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
IF DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN, HE IS SUBJECT TO 
STATE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL 
TERMINATION OF SUPERVISION OVER MIXED-BLOOD 
UTE INDIANS. 
Even if defendant's undocumented allegations of Indian 
status are taken as true, his conviction should be affirmed 
because his claimed Indian affiliation is with a group of Indians 
that has long been "terminated" from federal criminal 
jurisdiction. Defendant alleges that he is a member of the 
Uintah Band of Ute Indians, and that he is associated with the 
Affiliated Ute Citizens organization, groups that he identifies 
as "Distinct Legal entit[ies]n (Br. of Appellant at 38-39). 
Regarding the first allegation, defendant says that he 
is "a Recognized Member of the Uintah Band By Other Members 
thereof" (Br. of Appellant at 28), and does not say that he is 
formally enrolled in that band. He also cites his mother's 
listing on the final roll of "mixed-blood" Ute Indians, published 
in the April 5, 1956 Federal Register8 (Br. of Appellant at 36), 
as a basis for his Uintah band membership. 
As to the alleged membership in the Affiliated Ute 
Citizens, that entity is an organization of mixed-blood Ute 
Indians formed in 1956. It was formed for the purpose of 
representing the mixed-bloods in the distribution of tribal 
8Copied at Appendix 3 of this brief. 
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assets under the Ute Partition Act of 1954f 25 U.S.C.A. SS 677-
677aa (West 1983)- Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 135-36, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (1972). 
The mixed-blood Utes, including defendant's mother, 
were terminated from federal supervision under the Ute Partition 
Act. Regarding those mixed-blood Utes, the Act provides: 
All statutes of the United States which 
affect Indians because of their status as 
Indians shall no longer be applicable to such 
member over which supervision has been 
terminated, and the laws of the several 
States shall apply to such member in the same 
manner as they apply to other citizens within 
their jurisdiction. 
25 U.S.C. S 677v (1988) (emphasis added). The plain language of 
this provision has been unquestioned as ending federal criminal 
jurisdiction over mixed-blood Ute Indians, and vesting that 
jurisdiction in Utah's state courts. See United States v. 
Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 & n. 28 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 
752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985). Accord, St. Cloud v. United 
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (D.S.D. 1988) (Indians whose 
tribes have been "terminated" are subject to state jurisdiction). 
Therefore defendant, in claiming to be a mixed-blood Ute, brings 
himself within a class of citizens who, although they have Indian 
heritage, have been expressly made subject to state criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Defendant complains that st^te jurisdiction over his 
case should not be found just because of his mother's presence on 
the roll of "terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians. He argues that 
because he was not yet born when the Ute Partition Act took 
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effect, he cannot be one of the "individuals" who were 
"terminated" for federal criminal jurisdiction purposes, unless 
he is first afforded a hearing (Br. of Appellant at 37-40). This 
position is untenable, and unsupported by the history of the Ute 
Partition Act. 
Defendant's complaint is untenable because, by 
extension, it would suggest that nobody is bound by any law 
passed before his or her birth. The legislative history of the 
Act reveals that it was grounded in an agreement between full-
blood and mixed-blood Ute Indians to part company, as distinctive 
groups, with only the former group remaining under federal 
supervision. H.R. Rep. No. 2493, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954), 
reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3355-3359 (1954) 
(copied at Appendix 4 to this brief). Thus the consent of the 
mixed-blood Utes to this arrangement, in 1954, is binding upon 
their descendants today.9 Defendant, if he is descended from 
"terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians, is subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction of Utah state courts. 
Defendant also ties his claim of Indian status to his 
father's purported eligibility for tribal enrollment (Br. of 
Appellant at 36). It is unclear which tribe is allegedly open to 
defendant's father. It appears, however, that defendant is again 
referring to the Ute tribe, because hte identifies his paternal 
9
"Termination acts" such as the Ute Partition Act have been 
roundly criticized in more recent years, and in some instances 
repealed. See Felter, 546 F.Supp. at 1004-06. However, the Ute 
Partition Act, whether or not a "good" law, remains the law. 
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grandfather as an enrolled Uncompahgre (id.), and the Uncompahgre 
comprise one "band" of the Ute Indians. Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1093 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), 
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986). Thus it 
appears that defendant also claims a Ute tribe affiliation 
through his father. Defendant does not say, however, whether his 
father is or is not a "terminated" Indian. On the paternal side, 
then, defendant's jurisdictional status is indeterminate. 
Given, however, that defendant's more specific claimed 
Indian ancestry is traced to his mother, whose Indian status was 
clearly terminated for jurisdictional purposes, and that his 
claimed Indian affiliations are also to "terminated" mixed-blood 
Utes, these considerations should control here. By affiliating 
himself with people who have been terminated from federal 
criminal jurisdiction, then, defendant has effectively subjected 
himself to state criminal jurisdiction, notwithstanding his 
father's uncertain status. On this basis, the state court had 
jurisdiction to try him for forgery under the Ute Partition Act, 
and the conviction should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
IF THE CONVICTION CANNOT BE AFFIRMED 
OTHERWISE, THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE SHOULD BE 
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHERE DEFENDANT 
SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
A. Because No Evidence Relating to Defendant's 
Claimed Indian Status was Presented in the 
Trial Court, there is Nothing to Review on 
Appeal. 
If this Court applies a strict subject matter 
jurisdiction analysis to the Indian jurisdiction question, such 
that defendant can raise it even at this late date, and if it 
will not affirm defendant's conviction under the Ute Partition 
Act, the conviction still cannot be reversed at this time, as 
defendant urges. This Court cannot reach the merits of 
defendant's allegation that he is an Indian, because there is no 
evidence in the record on this fact-sensitive issue. 
Because the issue was never investigated by the trial 
court, only defendant's unsupported allegations of Indian blood 
and Indian recognition in his brief are before this Court. 
Therefore, because appellate courts do not sit to try disputed 
issues of fact, it would be premature for this Court to decide 
the jurisdictional issue raised by defendant at this time. 
Instead, the issue properly belongs in the trial court. 
B. Defendant's Indian Status Claim Should be 
Heard by the Trial Court on a Limited Remand. 
If defendant's jurisdictional question was not waived, 
the State suggests a remand to the trial court for the limited 
purpose of determining whether defendant is an Indian. If the 
trial court determines that defendant is an Indian, such that the 
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trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the conviction 
must then be set aside. State Dep't of Social Services v. Villi. 
784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (judgment entered by a court that 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void). 
By airing his jurisdictional challenge in the trial 
court, defendant will be availing himself of the forum that is 
equipped to decide the issues of fact related to that challenge. 
A full evidentiary hearing, unavailable in the appellate court, 
can be held. At such hearing, both defendant and the State can 
present evidence relating to defendant's claimed Indian status, 
and each side will have the opportunity to test the admissibility 
and credibility of the other's evidence. 
With the evidence before it, the trial court will 
decide whether the allegations that support defendant's claimed 
Indian status are true. The trial court will also be afforded 
the initial opportunity to decide which facts are relevant and 
necessary, as a matter of law, to prove or defeat defendant's 
claim of Indian status. If defendant is found to be a mixed-
blood Ute, the legal question of state jurisdiction over 
defendant under the Ute Partition Act can also be considered. 
Once all this is done, a complete record for appellate review of 
defendant's jurisdictional challenge will be available in the 
event that an appeal is again taken. 
C. In the Trial Court, Defendant Should Bear the 
Burden of Proving that He is an Indian. 
On remand, defendant should bear the burden of 
defeating state court jurisdiction by proving that he is an 
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Indian, because his conviction was entered by a state district 
court, a court of general jurisdiction.10 In a post-judgment 
challenge to the decision of such a court, the burden of proof is 
on the challenger to show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction: 
MWhen a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered 
by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that 
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking 
jurisdiction to prove its absence." Villi, 784 P.2d at 1133. 
This allocation of the burden may seem inconsistent 
with this court's holding, in State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April 23, 1991, Utah Supreme 
Court No. 910017, that the burden is on the State to show that 
defendant is not an Indian. It is not inconsistent, however. 
In light of Utah's statutory scheme for proof of 
criminal jurisdiction, Haaen places the burden of jurisdictional 
proof at trial on the State. Id. at 747; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-
201, 76-1-501(3) (1990). However, this case involves a 
jurisdictional challenge that has not been raised until long 
after trial. Accordingly, Viiil should control on remand, and 
the burden should be on defendant, by proving that he is an 
Indian, to show that the state court lacked jurisdiction. 
Placing the burden of proof upon defendant under these 
10Defendant was tried and convicted in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court. Utah's district courts have "original jurisdiction 
in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute 
. . . ." Utah Const. Art. VIII, S 5. "The district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-3-4(1) (1990). 
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circumstances would also be sound policy. As noted earlier, this 
jurisdictional challenge may encourage other defendants to raise 
the Indian jurisdiction question, even if it was never raised at 
trial. Placing the burden on defendants to prove the absence of 
jurisdiction will expedite the handling of such future belated 
claims. It will also help discourage those claims that are 
frivolous. Finally, it will be the defendants pressing such 
claims, and not the State, who will have ready access to the 
information needed to show that they are Indians, and that 
jurisdiction should be examined. 
In summary, if defendant's jurisdictional challenge is 
to be entertained at this late date, the trial court is the 
proper place in which to do so- If this challenge is thus 
remanded to the trial court, the burden should be on defendant to 
prove that he is an Indian. 
CONCLUSION 
Based either on Point One or Point Two of this brief, 
defendant's conviction should be affirmed. However, if this 
court cannot affirm on either of those bases, neither should it 
reverse the conviction, for no evidence relevant to defendant's 
claimed Indian status exists in the record now on appeal. In 
that event, as set forth in Point Three, this case should be 
remanded to the trial court, where defendant should bear the 
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burden of proving that jurisdiction was lacking. 
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